Abstract-Increasingly, cyberspace is the battlefield of choice for twenty first century criminal activity and foreign conflict. This suggests that traditional modeling and simulation approaches have stalled in the information security domain. We propose a game theoretic model based on a multistage model of computer network exploitation (CNE) campaigns comprising reconnaissance, tooling, implant, lateral movement, exfiltration and cleanup stages. In each round of the game, the attacker chooses whether to proceed with the next stage of the campaign, nature decides whether the defender is cognizant of the campaign's progression, and the defender chooses to respond in an active or passive fashion. We propose a dynamic, asymmetric, complete-information, general-sum game to model CNE campaigns and techniques to estimate this game's parameters. Researchers can extend this work to other threat models, and practitioners can use this work for decision support.
I. INTRODUCTION
A steadily growing list of high-consequence computer network operations suggests that cyberspace is the battlefield of choice for twenty first century criminal activity and foreign conflict. The Ukraine power grid attack of December 2015, the April 2016 United States Democratic National Committee (DNC) hack, the Banner Health spill of June 2016, the October 2016 Dyn Domain Name System (DNS) Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (MTA) ransom of November 2016 and the May 2017 WannaCry pandemic exemplify this. Information security managers and incident handlers require decision support tools to forecast impacts of their investment decisions and technical responses, respectively. Mathematical (e.g., closed form equations) and stochastic (e.g., Petri nets) models provide rigorous insight based on first principles. However, these models fall short when it comes to the human element of cyber warfare. Simulations and emulations suffer from the same flaw. Furthermore, simulations and emulations are not viable at Internet of Things (IoT) scale.
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Despite these shortcomings, leaders and incident responders still require situational awareness. Game theoretic models consider the collaborative and competitive interaction between rational players striving to achieve their own best possible outcomes. This technique has yielded great results in the field of economics where eleven game theorists have won the Nobel prize [1] . Decision makers can use game theoretic models to implement defensive measures, and information security practitioners can develop tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that render attacks nonviable. We propose an extensive form game that is noncooperative, asymmetric and general sum; the current iteration of the game uses only discrete strategies and assumes perfect information. Although perfect information is a strong assumption, it is not without precedent. Many products in the literature consider Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) which make this same assumption. Next, we identify the payoff functions for the attacker and the defender for every pure strategy set in the game. Third, we calculate pure Nash equilibria for the game. Finally, we demonstrate the sensitivity of the game's parameters.
We consider a sophisticated criminal or state-sponsored adversary. We assume their primary goal is to steal private data. This brand of operation is referred to as a computer network exploitation (CNE) campaign. We assume the adversary is concerned with avoiding detection: Detection can lead to attribution, which can lead to prosecution in a law enforcement scenario and embarrassment and reduced negotiating position in a diplomatic scenario. Also, intuitively, stolen private data that is not known to be stolen has a higher value. Contrast this threat model with those involving computer network attack (CNA) scenarios or naive attackers.
We assume the adversary will proceed according to the multistage model shown in Figure 1 . They will begin by surveilling the victim. Next, the adversary will write and customize the tools required to carry out the campaign. Third, they will implant the victim to achieve an initial foothold for the operation. Next, the adversary will move laterally from the point of initial compromise to the final objective in an island-hopping fashion. Finally, in the CNE scenario, they will proceed with exfiltrating the victim's private data.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: First, Section II surveys other work related to this topic. Next, 978-1-5386-4649-6/18/$31.00 c 2018 IEEE Section III proposes a game theoretic model for CNE campaigns. Third, Section IV describes techniques to estimate the model parameters and demonstrates the sensitivity of these parameters. Finally, Section V contains our conclusions from the study and identifies future lines of research.
II. LITERATURE SEARCH
Tadelis provides a contemporary introduction to game theory in [20] . His work defines the basic terms and explains the fundamental concepts underlying game theory.
Liang and Xiao [12] survey the game theory literature relating to security. Their work identifies research gaps, such as multiple defenders and improper standards for constructing utility functions. The authors organize the literature in five ways: First, Liang and Xiao separate the cooperative from the non-cooperative games. Next, they distinguish the complete from the incomplete-information models. Third, the authors divide the perfect from the imperfect-information games. Next, Liang and Xiao split the static from the dynamic models. Finally, they discriminate the attack-defense work from the security measurement games. The authors would classify our work as a non-cooperative, dynamic, attack-defense game with complete and perfect-information.
Manshaei, et al. [13] survey the literature related to games with realistic security problems. The authors organize the literature into six categories: Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers one and two, self-organizing networks, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), anonymity and privacy, economic aspects and cryptography. Manshaei, et al. would classify our work as economic.
Backhaus, et al. [6] give a realistic view of applying game theory to a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system: specifically, smart grid voltage and power controls. They propose an imperfect-information, semi net-form game (SNFG) played by an attacker and a defender. In the model, an attacker wishes to compromise the SCADA system while a defender tries to prevent this. The defender does not know if the attacker is present, so they use a statistical representation of memory to infer attacker presence. The attacker controls the voltage (V 1 ) via the under-load tap changer (ULTC), and the defender controls the power output (q 3 ) of the distributed generator. Defender policies are tuned when training against different assumptions, such as an attacker being present a certain percent of the time. The authors use level-k reasoning as their solution concept. Backhaus, et al. found that by assuming an attacker to be present more than 20% of the time, the defender is able to prevent an attacker from receiving a large reward. The game we propose is more generalizable than this model.
Chen and Leneutre's [8] threat model considers a CNA adversary actioning heterogeneous networks. In contrast, our threat model includes CNE actors. The victim networks are heterogeneous in the sense that hosts have different levels of both resilience to and value to the attacker. They propose a noncooperative, static, complete and perfect-information game played by multiple attackers and by multiple defenders. The authors' game is a variant of an SSG, and Chen and Leneutre find its Nash equilibria.
Esmalifalak, et al. [9] explain how a zero-sum, strategic game can be applied to maintaining accurate network measurements on a smart grid using phasor measurement units (PMUs). An attacker and a defender play this game: The attacker is aware that the defender cannot actively defend all the measurements simultaneously, and the defender is aware that the attacker cannot attack all the measurements. The attacker's goal is to find the measurements that are the most important and have the least risk of being detected if corrupted. The attacker chooses two measurements to attack, and the defender chooses two measurements to defend. The authors use linear programming to solve the game. While Esmalifalak, et al.'s work could relate to CNE games where the adversary intends to sharpshoot the least guarded and highest value data, the model we propose is a dynamic, general-sum game.
Farhang, et al.'s [10] threat model aims to prevent malicious clients from using service providers as a gateway to action a third party. They created a framework to help a service provider exploit historical client interactions. If the service provider determines the client is malicious, they must decide if the cost of defending is higher or lower than the associated reward. If the cost is lower, it is a cheap defense so the service provider defends. On the other hand, if the cost is higher, it is an expensive defense so the service provider does not defend. If the service provider cannot determine if the client is malicious, the service provider reverts to defending some percentage of the time. To make this decision, it is paramount to have a good understanding of what the suspect is doing. The authors propose a repeated, static, incomplete-information game. In contrast, we propose a more generalizable dynamic, complete-information game. Farhang, et al. consider two types of end users: benign and attacker. The end user chooses one of two strategies: act greedily or normally. The service provider chooses one of two strategies: defend or not. The authors find the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria for this game. Hota, et al. [11] study a game involving a federation of defenders protecting a cyber-physical system (CPS). They propose a static game played by multiple defenders, each of whom is responsible for one or more of the CPS components. In contrast, our model is a dynamic, attack-defense game. Defenders share management of the nodes at the edge of their areas of responsibility. The authors consider two defense strategies: In the edge-based strategy, the defenders determine who is responsible for handling the possible attack if it fits within the total defense budget for the defender. In the node-based strategy, the defense is based on the rate at which nodes' configurations are updated. The CPS component interdependency graph is a key artifact of this investigation. Hota, et al. find pure Nash equilibria and contrast these with Pareto optimal solutions.
Mc Carthy, et al.'s [14] threat model considers CNE using DNS queries. The proposed model is a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) which is a stochastic game with one player [2] . In contrast, we propose a dynamic game with two players. The cost component of the utility function is based on the cost of mislabeling a domain and the cost of monitoring the nodes. Labeling a legitimate domain as malicious (or vice-versa) increases the cost. By focusing on the domains rather than the nodes, the cost would be equivalent to the sum of domain dependent terms. These can be simplified by splitting the POMDP into multiple POMDPs. This model detects attacks in near real-time by acting on two different parts: offline splitting of the original POMDP into multiple specific POMDPs and the online reasoning about policies at execution time. When the POMDP is factored into several other POMDPs, each one can quickly solve the costminimizing mixed integer linear program (MILP). Then, the policies are delegated to each of the sub-agents as decisions are made. The authors experiment with different discount factors.
Noureddine, et al. [15] focus on disrupting an attacker's lateral movement; this gives network administrators more time to respond to the campaign. They propose a dynamic, zerosum game played by an attacker and a defender: The attacker chooses what nodes to compromise, and the defender chooses what services to disconnect from each node. In contrast, our model is a general-sum game that offers different strategies to the players. The game-theoretic network response engine ingests different information from IDSs to determine the location of sensitive and vulnerable nodes and what nodes' disconnection would disrupt an attacker's spread. Knowing the sensitive and vulnerable nodes helps the system predict what nodes will be most targeted. The model makes no assumptions about the attacker other than limiting the number of actions the attacker can take within a period. This allows for the defender to cope with the attacker trying to use its knowledge of the system to trick the defender. The system is effective at slowing down, and sometimes preventing, adversaries from compromising a node. The only side effect is the cost associated with false positives. Using IDS information can be effective against CNE campaigns, even if it's just to provide more information on what nodes are vulnerable. This information could improve a defender's actions.
Panaousis, et al.'s [16] threat model considers commodity attacks against assets placed at different depths in the network. These depths comprise: demilitarized zone, middleware and private. Their first step is to analyze the risk of the subject's assets and determine the effectiveness of the current security controls. The authors create control games to figure out the best way for an organization to implement each control given the risk assessments. In these games, the defender plays a Nash equilibrium that limits the damage from the attacker. Panaousis, et al.'s design runs different plans (investment strategies for protecting targets) against each target to determine the expected damage. It chooses the set of plans that minimizes the highest expected damage because the security of a system is only as strong as the weakest point. The proposed model is a static, noncooperative, zero-sum game that an attacker and a defender play. The attacker chooses what nodes to attack, and the defender chooses what defensive techniques to implement at what depths of the network. In contrast, our model is a dynamic, general-sum game that offers different strategies to the players.
The threat model of Rasouli, et al. [17] focuses on a progressive campaign. They propose a dynamic, imperfectinformation game played by an attacker and a defender. The campaign progresses through two dimensions. First, the adversary spreads laterally from host to host. Second, the adversary seeks to deepen their control of compromised hosts. The authors consider a network of K computers, each of which is in one of four security states: normal, compromised, fully compromised and remotely compromised. Rasouli, et al. use dynamic programming to solve the game. Their threat model is like ours, and this is the most similar product to ours in the literature. One major difference is the strategies available to the players: The authors' defender can do nothing, sense a host or reimage a host. On the other hand, our defender can respond actively or passively.
Shiva, et al.'s [19] , [18] threat model is undefined: in their words "the game model is not specific to any particular attack." They discuss a stochastic, imperfect-information, zero-sum game played by an attacker and a defender. In contrast, we propose a dynamic, perfect-information, generalsum game. The defender chooses the strategy for three layers of security: self-checking hardware and software components, cryptography and built-in/bolt-on security. The defender redirects malicious data flows to a honeynet. Each player is unaware of their opponent's state; to estimate it, each player computes what the opponent's best strategy is. A player iterates through the game many times to do this. The threat model of Zhang, et al. [21] focuses on opportunistic crime: This means a less sophisticated attacker that exploits soft targets of opportunity rather than one specific hard target. They propose the Opportunistic Security Game (OSG) which is played by one attacker and multiple defenders. In contrast, one attacker and one defender play our dynamic game. The OSG is an extension of the SSG. The authors also propose a technique to identify the best defender strategy.
III. EXTENSIVE FORM GAME
Game theoretic models have four basic pieces which we now describe in turn.
A. Players
Our game has three players: an attacker, a defender and nature; nature may also be called chance or lottery. We refer to the attacker as player 1, the defender as player 2 and nature as player N.
B. Information
Our attacker and defender both know the payoffs for both players for all game outcomes. In this game, they also know all the previously made moves in the game. This is a simplifying assumption that we will relax in future work. Nature knows the defender's probability of detecting each stage of the campaign.
C. Actions
When it is the attacker's turn to play, they choose to quit the campaign or proceed with the next stage. When nature plays, it determines if the defender detects the stage or not. When it is the defender's turn to play, they choose to respond passively or actively to the stage.
D. Payoffs
The payoffs to the players are a function of the strategies that they play and the model parameters described in Table I . To summarize, the c i parameters represent a cost or penalty to player i. Next, the r i parameters represent a reward to player i. Finally, the p parameters represent the probability of player 2 (the defender) detecting a stage of the attack.
1) Payoffs of Outcomes: First, we consider payoffs as a function of outcome. Formally, this is u i (o): the utility to player i given outcome o. We work through three examples to demonstrate the implementation of this function. Figure 3 , so the index of this outcome is 0, and we call it o 0 . The game reaches this outcome if the attacker quits the campaign before the surveillance stage. Intuitively, the payoff to both players for this degenerate game is zero. Formally, u 1 (o 0 ) = 0. This is because the attacker did not invest in any stage of the campaign and did not harvest the defender's private data. Also, u 2 (o 0 ) = 0. This is because the defender did not respond actively to any stage of the campaign, did not spill their private data and did not detect any of the attacker's tools.
a) Timid
Attacker Example: We begin numbering the outcomes at the top of the game shown in
b) Committed Attacker, Unlucky Defender Example:
We proceed with numbering outcomes in Figure 3 from left to right, so the index of this outcome is 36, and we call it o 36 . The game reaches this outcome if the attacker proceeds with each stage of the campaign, and nature is cruel to the defender: They fail to detect any of the stages. Intuitively, this is the best case scenario for the attacker and the worst-case scenario for the defender. Formally,
This is because the attacker invested in every stage of the campaign and harvested the defender's private data. The former incurred the c 1, * costs, and the latter entitled them to the r 1,E reward. On the other hand,
This is because the defender did not respond actively to any stage of the campaign, did spill their private data and did not detect any of the attacker's tools. This incurred only the c 2,P cost. c) Committed Attacker, Cagey Defender Example: The index of this outcome is 47, so we call it o 47 . The game reaches this outcome if the attacker proceeds with each stage of the campaign, but nature is kind to the defender: They detect every stage. Furthermore, the defender is steely, and responds passively until the exfiltration stage of the campaign. At this last possible opportunity, the defender ends the campaign by responding actively. This is the counterpart to the scenario described in Section III-D1b: It is the nightmare situation for the attacker and the dream situation for the defender. Formally,
This is because the attacker invested in every stage of the campaign but did not harvest the defender's private data. The former incurred the c 1, * costs. On the other hand,
This is because the defender responded actively only to the exfiltration stage of the campaign, did not spill their private data and detected each of the attacker's four tools. This incurred only the c 2,E cost and entitled them to the r 2, * rewards.
2) Payoffs of Strategies:
Now, we consider payoffs as a function of strategy. Formally, this is v i (s): the expected utility to player i given strategy set s. This is an expected value rather than a known quantity because stochastic processes are involved. The strategy set s comprises one component for each of the choices the attacker and defender can potentially make during the game; therefore, there are nine elements. We refer to the strategy set of the attacker and defender as s A and s D , respectively. The complete strategy set s is the concatenation of s A and s B . Again, we work through three examples to demonstrate the implementation of v i (s). a) Timid Attacker Example: The strategy set s A of the attacker is (Q, * , * , * , * ). This indicates they will quit (Q) the campaign before the surveillance stage. We use a wildcard to specify the other four components because the analysis applies to all values for these components; they will never come into play. The strategy set s D of the defender is ( * , * , * , * ). We use a wildcard to specify all four components because the defender never gets to play given this attacker strategy set. In this degenerate case,
b) Curious Attacker, Greedy Defender Example: The strategy set s A of the attacker is (S, Q, * , * , * ). This indicates they will survey the defender (S) and then quit (Q) the campaign before the tooling stage. The strategy set s D of the defender is (P, * , * , * ). This indicates they will respond passively (P) to a detected survey. Unlike the example in Section III-D2a, there is a stochastic event: The defender detects the attacker's survey with probability p S . To calculate the expected utility of s, we multiply the utility of each of the corresponding outcomes by the probability it occurs. Formally,
We did not walk through the calculation of u i (o 1 ) and u i (o 2 ) in Section III-D1; we leave this as an exercise for the motivated reader. c) Curious Attacker, Risk Averse Defender Example: As in Section III-D2b, the strategy set s A of the attacker is (S, Q, * , * , * ). However, the strategy set s D of the defender is (A, * , * , * ) in this example. This indicates they will respond actively (A) to a detected survey. We calculate v i (s) in a similar fashion as in Section III-D2b:
Again, we leave the calculation of u i (o 3 ) as an exercise for the motivated reader.
E. Single-Stage Game
To introduce the full campaign game, we begin with the single stage game shown in Figure 2 . A 1, N or 2 labels each vertex. This indicates it is the attacker, nature or defender's turn. Each leg is annotated with the associated choice. At the beginning of the stage, the attacker has the initiative. They choose to quit (Q) the campaign or proceed with stage X, where X is one of the survey, tool, implant, move or exfiltrate stages mentioned in Figure 1 . Next, nature determines if the defender detects stage X or not with probability with p X or 1 − p X , respectively. Third, the defender chooses to respond passively (P) or actively (A). An example of a passive response is reverse engineering the artifacts associated with the stage. Disconnecting the host being actioned is an example of an active response. To compose the game for the full campaign, we join the single-stage games at their missed detection and passive response legs. With respect to Figure 2 , the missed detection leg proceeds down and to the left from the N vertex. The passive response leg proceeds down and to the left from the vertex labeled 2 in Figure 2 . The campaign stops if the attacker breaks off the operation or the defender responds actively. This latter situation is because sophisticated state-sponsored adversary we describe in the threat model in Section I will be 
F. Full-Campaign Game
spooked into aborting the operation. The full-campaign game collapses slightly if we assume the probability of detecting the tooling stage (p T ) is zero. Even so, this is a sophisticated game. It has 48 outcomes, 2 5 attacker strategies and 2 4 defender strategies.
IV. PARAMETERS Table I lists the nineteen parameters that constrain our game. The six attacker related parameters include the cost of executing each stage of the campaign and the value of the target data. The thirteen defender related parameters include the relative cost of responding actively to each stage of the campaign, the probability of detecting each stage of the campaign and the value of the threat intelligence harvested from each stage of the attack and the cost of spilling the target data.
Game theoretic models assume all players are rational. Rational players have payoffs that are complete: Any two payoffs can be ranked, and they are all transitive. To do this, we express most parameters in terms of a single unit of measurement: United States Dollars (USD). (This choice is arbitrary-any brand of currency will do.) The remaining parameters are unitless.
A. Costs of Carrying Out Attack Stages
We borrow from economics and consider three basic factors of production: land, labor and capital [3] . Capital includes fixed assets and services: Fixed assets include workstations and servers. Services include network access, hosted storage and processing. Labor includes the financial compensation of the humans carrying out the stage. We propose that labor will dominate these parameters. Therefore, we can estimate these costs by multiplying the duration of the stage by the staffing level and again by the labor rate. For example, we could estimate that a tooling stage will last three months and be staffed by 5 people who receive $200 per hour. This is
B. Reward of Exfiltrating Private Data
One estimate of the reward of exfiltrating private data is the market value of the data. As an example, we consider the Equifax data breach. Full identity details are worth about $20 each on the black market [4] . This spill may have affected 143 million people [5] , which means the perpetrator grossed $2.86B.
Note that the reward of exfiltrating private data is not the same as the cost of spilling the same private data. We discuss this later in Section IV-F.
C. Relative Costs of Active Responses
The active response to a detected CNE campaign stage is a superset of its passive counterpart. For example, a passive response will involve reverse engineering the stage artifacts, and an active response will involve both disconnecting the host and reversing the artifacts. Therefore we consider the relative cost of active responses. The bulk of this expense is the inconvenience to the human owner of the host. The human should be able to get a replacement device in a few days, so our estimates for these parameters are guided by the cost of lost productivity over that period. For example, we could estimate that the human owner of a disconnected host loses 50% productivity, it takes one week (40 hours in the US workforce) to arrange a replacement device and the human costs $200 an hour. The relative cost of an active response is
It would not be out of the question to consider a single c 2,SIM E = c 2,S = c 2,I = c 2,M = c 2,E .
D. Probability of Detecting Attack Stages
We propose that estimating the probability of detecting a stage of a CNO campaign begins with the sensitivity, or true positive rate (TPR), of the defender's intrusion detection system. Next, we observe that not all stages are equally noisy. We propose estimating p X as some factor K X of TPR. The aggregate p X should match the IDS sensitivity. Therefore, the selections of K X should be constrained by 1 = K X . For example, assume the defender concentrates twice as many sensors at the edge of the network than they do on the inside of their network. In this situation, the noisiness of the survey, implant and exfiltration stages are about the same, while the lateral movement stage is about half as noisy. This gives us a system of two independent equations with two variables. This first equation is:
This second equation is:
Solving this system gives us
E. Reward of Detecting Attack Stages
Sophisticated cyber enterprises will be party to formal or ad hoc agreements to share indicators of compromise (IOCs) with peers. These peers serve as force multipliers for the cyber security workforce. There are no free rides in this world, so the biggest benefit of detecting campaign stages is paying the premium associated with these memberships. As the enterprise detects campaign stages, they reverse the associated artifacts and pass IOCs on to their peers.
As Brooks [7] observed, we cannot simply consider this force multiplication in a linear fashion. For example, if an enterprise shares IOCs with another similar organization, it does not double its capability. However, the cyber defense gain (G) is some function of the number of peer cyber security organizations and their characteristics. Providing a precise and satisfying estimate for G is beyond the scope of this article, but we can use G to estimate r 2, * . Like what we propose for c 2,SIM E in Section IV-C, it would not be out of the question to consider a single r 2 = r 2,S = r 2,I = r 2,M = r 2,E . Another factor to consider is how productive the enterprise has to be to retain membership in the consortium; we represent this with t: the amount of membership time one set of IOCs buys. The third factor to consider is the labor cost of the cyber security department amortized over the membership quantum, L. So: r 2 = G t L. For example, if membership in the cyber consortium gives us a gain of 2, one set of IOCs will keep us in good-standing with our peers for 3 months and our monthly payroll is $170k (5 people working 170 hours in a month at $200 an hour): r 2 = 2 · 3 · $170k = $1.02M.
F. Cost of Spilling Private Data
At first glance, estimating the cost of spilling private data should be as simple as reusing the reward of harvesting this same data. After all, the defender should be able to simply buy the private data back from the attacker. However, this does not work for two reasons. First, this presupposes the attacker is honest and will only sell the private data once. However, even if the attacker is honest in the business sense, that attacker may be motivated by something other than money. Specifically, this is true when the adversary is sponsored by a state, as opposed to a criminal organization. Unfortunately, this departs from our basic ground rules of rational players purely motivated by maximizing their own utility. We will deal with this in future work as described in Section V.
G. Sensitivity
This game would not be very interesting if it always recommended the same strategy set or recommended the same strategy set for reasonable ranges of the parameters. To explore this, we exercised these parameters over the ranges indicated in Table I and found five different pure Nash equilibria. However, not all the parameters are equally impactful. One or more of these equilibria went away if we fixed r 1,E , r 2,SIM E , c 2,P , p I or p E . This suggests that these are the high impact parameters.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We make three basic contributions in this paper. First, we propose a dynamic, asymmetric, perfect and completeinformation game to model CNE campaigns. Next, we propose techniques to estimate this game's parameters. Third, we demonstrated the sensitivity of this game.
We look forward to extending this work in many ways: First, we will consider CNA scenarios. Next, we will modify the lateral movement stage to be a repeated game: The adversary will implant a target of opportunity to achieve an initial foothold on the victim and then move laterally to reach the final objective. Third, we will consider various types of defenders and attackers. For example, the defenders will be more or less risk averse, and the attackers will be more or less confident they have evaded detection. This will lead to Bayesian Nash equilibria instead of pure Nash equilibria. This is the pathway to relaxing our perfect-information assumption. Next, a stochastic, imperfect-information game may be more externally valid. In this game, the player will choose an action and receive a payoff that depends on the current state. We will estimate the current state by running many different models to figure out the opposing player's best move. In other words, we will estimate the current state by back-propagating the best outcome for the opposing player. An attacker may decide that they have been successful so far and the payoff for stopping and coming back later outweighs that of continuing and pressing their luck against nature and the defender. Then the game moves into a new state based on a probability of the players' actions. This would be like nature deciding if the attacker was found based on the actions of the attacker and defender. Fifth, we will apply a discount factor to the game. Next, we anticipate decomposing the campaign level game into component subgames to achieve deeper results. Seventh, as Liang and Xiao [12] point out, there are many examples where a game should consider multiple defenders. In the case of a CNE campaign, if the network is large enough, there will be different teams defending the network that do not always communicate quickly with each other. The model will not be complete unless it can account for the other players. Next, we will respond to Liang and Xiao's call to standardize payoff function construction. In the imperfect-information models, a player's move will depend on anticipating the other player's move. Having an improper payoff function can reduce the effectiveness of the player's prediction, thus reducing the effectiveness of the game. Finally, we will study security capacity [13] , which is the maximum achievable network level of security. The security capacity provides a realistic security goal and defines the upper bound on achievable security on target nodes.
